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I.  Introduction 
One of the key convergence criteria set out in the Treaty on European Union concerns the 
public finances.  According to article I 04c and the appended protocol, Member States are to 
avoid  excessive deficits  defined  in terms of a reference value of 3 percent of GDP  and  in 
terms of  a public debt reference value of60 percent ofGDP.  In its November 1994 review of 
the state of the public finances in the Member States the ECOFIN found that ten out of  the 
then twelve had  an  excessive  deficit.  Correcting the  public  finances  has  become  a  most 
difficult problem to tackle in the move to stage III of EMU.  This paper contributes to the 
debate on the correction of the fiscal  imbalances in the Community by taking an empirical 
view  of the  determination  of government  expenditure  and  revenues  and  the  possible 
interdependence between the two.  Correction of  fiscal imbalances and the feasibility of  fiscal 
adjustment  depend  crucially  on  knowing  the  causes  of fiscal  deficits.  Conversely,  a 
permanent reduction in the fiscal disequilibrium characterizing the Member States will not be 
possible  unless  the  proximate  causes  of these  imbalances  are  established  and  adequately 
addressed. 
Public expenditure has consistently exceeded receipts in virtually all the Member States of  the 
Community and over much of  the post-War II historical record.  Since the first oil shock and 
throughout the period up to the first half of the last decade large deficits have continued to 
plague the public finances.  Furthermore, on a cyclically adjusted basis, net borrowing by the 
general government remained in the range of 4 percent of Community GDP until the end of 
the 1980s.  While the total deficit for the Community EC-12 did not start rising as a share of 
Community GDP until the recession of the 1990s,  the structural deficit had marked a step 
increase  in  1988  and  continued  on  the  upward  path  until  1993.  In  the  Commission's 
November  1994  short-term  forecast  the  structural  and  total  deficit  for  virtually  all  the 
Member States is expected to persist at a time when the first date for the assessment of  the 
prospects for monetary unification will be approaching. 
Will  it  be  feasible  to  redress  the  fiscal  imbalances  to  the  extent  necessary  to  meet  the 
convergence  criteria?  The  present  paper  reviews  this  question  by  taking  an  explicitly 
empirical perspective based on Granger-causality.  Drawing upon the evidence of fiscal data 
over the period 1960-94 from thirteen Community Member States1 it attempts to determine 
Luxembourg and Sweden are excluded due to incomplete data availability in the AMECO data bank; 
see footnote 36 for a further comment. -2-
the  nature  of government  revenue  and  expenditure  decisions  as  revealed  by  the  data 
themselves,  organized in a bivariate framework,  without imposing prior restrictions on the 
underlying  structural  relationships2.  While  undoubtedly  fiscal  decisions  are  political, 
understanding  of the  dynamics  of budgetary  decisions  as  revealed  by  the  historical 
correlations should also  contribute to a better evaluation of the causes of fiscal  imbalances 
and of  the consequences of  proposed fiscal consolidation policies in the Community. 
In  addition  to  the  introduction,  the  paper  has  seven  sections:  section  II  reviews  the 
relationship  between  revenue  and  expenditure  determination  from  a  public  finance 
perspective;  sections III and IV present general remarks on the Granger-causality model and 
the testing procedure followed in the paper;  section V presents the results of the causality 
tests for government revenues and expenditure;  section VI reviews the question of  whether 
causality runs from public spending to the fiscal deficit or from revenues to the fiscal deficit, 
while section VII reviews the issue of whether fiscal imbalances Granger-cause government 
spending and increase the size of  the government;  and section VIII concludes with remarks 
on the prospects for fiscal adjustment in the Member States under review.  Two annexes are 
also included:  Annex I discusses the time-series properties of the data and presents some 
pertinent cointegration results, and Annex II presents further diagnostic results concerning the 
properties of  the Granger-causality equations. 
II.  Government Revenue and Expenditure Determination 
Fiscal imbalances in the Community have deteriorated to an extent unprecedented in a peace 
time period such as that since the early 1970s3.  Government revenues in the Community EC-
11  (excluding  Greece,  Spain,  Luxembourg  and  Sweden  for  which  consistent  time  series 
dating 1960 do not exist) have grown from an average of 35.4 percent of GDP in the 1960s 
to 44.9 percent of  GDP in the first 1980s, and to an average of 45.6 percent in the first four 
years of  the present decade.  Revenue growth has not kept up with the growth of  government 
expenditure.  The latter has advanced by  15 percentage points in terms of GDP between the 
decade of the  1960s and  the  1990s.  The  share of general government  spending to GDP, 
which represented an average of35.6 percent in the 1960s, averaged 50.6 percent ofGDP in 
the first four years of  the 1990s.  These reflect substantial increases in inflation-adjusted terms 
too.  Correspondingly, the small deficits recorded in the  1960s up to the early  1970s gave 
way to increasingly large deficits in subsequent decades.  Thus, the average value of general 
government net borrowing in the 1960s was 0.24 percent of GDP;  in the  1970s it grew to 
2.6 percent ofGDP; in the 1980s it grew by an average of another 1.5 percentage points to a 
value of 4.1  percent of GDP;  and  in the first  four  years  of the  1990s it has grown to an 
2 
3 
There is a  paucity of empirical evidence on this issue from  an international perspective,  with a 
dominant part of  the literature examining US data.  Ram (1988b) has marshalled some evidence from 
a  diverse  international group,  which includes  some  Community Member  States,  but his sample, 
which starts around 1958-1960, includes observations up to the mid-1980s.  The present study adds 
another ten years of data,  a crucial consideration since causality testing as  well as the quality of 
inference depends on long data series. 
de Haan et. al. (1994) discuss these developments in more detail. -3-
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average  of  5. 0  percent  of 
GDP.  The basic flow data are 
displayed  in  Graph  1 and  are 
largely  representative  of the 
fiscal  circumstances of all  the 
eleven  Member  States 
constituting the EC-11  group 
shown here. 
As  a  result  of these  trends, 
public  debt  has  also  risen 
throughout  this  period  to 
levels  which  are  currently 
threatening  the  sustainability 
of  fiscal  positions  in  most 
Member  States.  The 
awareness  of the  risks  that 
persistent  fiscal  imbalances 
engender  has  increased  in 
recent years, particularly since the adoption of the Treaty on European Union,  and virtually 
all the Member States have adopted convergence programs aimed at complying with the debt 
and deficit, as well as the other, convergence criteria4. 
The rapid  growth in  government expenditure relative to GDP  in the past quarter century, 
typified  by Wagner's law5,  and  the emergence of structural deficits is not restricted to the 
Community  but it  has  been  a characteristic  of all  the  OECD  economies6.  An additional 
characteristic has been the failure to contain and ultimately reverse these imbalances so that 
both the mushrooming deficits and the growth in public debt come under control.  In the case 
of the  eleven  Community  Member  States  shown  in  Graph  1,  it  appears  that the  ratio  of 
government expenditure to GDP  has advanced in discontinuous jumps in  1974 and in 1981 
subsequently reaching  a plateau.  In the latter part of the  1980s the  rapid  growth of the 
4 
5 
6 
The Treaty on European Union sets out fiscal convergence criteria for the general government deficit 
(3  percent of GDP) and for the general government debt (60 percent of GDP or approaching this 
mark at a sufficient pace)~ see articles 104c and the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure of  the 
Treaty. 
Wagner's law refers to the notion that government expenditure rises faster than GDP and, as a result, 
the size of  the government increases over time.  One conventional explanation for Wagner's law (see 
the volume edited by Lybeck and Henrekson (1988) for a discussion of various aspects of Wagner's 
law) is that public goods are luxury goods characterized by steeply sloped Engel curves.  This would 
suggest that the share of government expenditure in GDP  would be bounded by  unity~  in most 
countries,  however,  this ratio  has  grown at a  diminishing rate once  a  threshold  level  has  been 
reached, or it has altogether stabilized.  Thus, the luxury good explanation is inconsistent with the 
empirical facts.  See footnote 30 below for a brief reference to equilibrium choice models explaining 
the size of  the government in democracies. 
See Roubini and Sachs (1989a), Roubini and Sachs (1989b), and Alesina and Perotti (1994) and the 
references therein. -4-
Community  economies  contributed  to reducing  this  ratio  but  the  recession  of the  1990s 
pushed it up once more. 
The share of  revenues in Community EC-11  GDP reached a peak of  around 45 percent in the 
early 1980s and stabilized at that level for approximately ten years.  There was a modest rise 
in the ratio in 1993  and in 1994 reflecting primarily the cyclical deterioration of GDP rather 
than  discretionary  taxation  increases  to  reduce  the  deficit.  During  stage  II  of EMU, 
convergence  programs  provide  for  some  revenue  adjustments  to  contribute  to  budgetary 
consolidation. 
Despite the policy adjustments incorporated in the convergence programs, the feasibility of 
fiscal adjustment and of  respecting the fiscal convergence targets remains in doubt.  A failure 
to address the fiscal imbalances, especially in periods of strong economic growth such as the 
second part of the 1980s, raises questions about the nature of the politico-economic model 
underlying  revenue,  expenditure  and  fiscal  balance  determination  in  these  industrial 
democracies.  It is clear that if the model which has generated the fiscal data of  the Member 
States over the past thirty four  years  continues to prevail in  the future,  doubts  should  be 
raised  about  the fiscal  consolidation prospects.  It is  of crucial importance,  therefore,  to 
establish the nature of  the fiscal processes underlying the revenue and expenditure data. 
In a review of six possible models which could account for the rise in deficits and in public 
debt, as well as the divergent fiscal experience among the OECD nations, Alesina and Perotti 
(1994) suggest that the data are consistent with the model which explains deficits in terms of 
political  conflicts  between  social  groups  and  among  members  of the  same  coalition 
government;  and  with the  model which  emphasizes  budget  institutions  and  procedures  as 
determinants  of deficits  7.  With respect  to the  former  class  of models,  these  predict that 
fragmentation  of governments  and  low  degree  of political  cohesion  imply  difficulties  in 
effecting fiscal adjustment and delays in halting the rise of  public debt;  further, these models 
predict that coalition governments would tend to be associated with higher deficits and debt 
than single-party governments.  de  Haan,  Sterks and  de  Kam (1992) also  find  support for 
these hypotheses in  their  study of the Community budgetary policies.  Roubini  and  Sachs 
(1989a)  find  that  in  the  period  1975-85  the  OECD  nations  with  the  shortest  average 
government tenure, characterized also by coalitions governments, were those with the largest 
increase in the debt ratio (Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Italy, recording increases 
ofbetween 6.16 percentage points (Belgium) to 3.65 percentage points (Italy)). 
The second class of models predicts that the rules according to which budgetary policy is 
designed, approved and executed determine the fiscal outcomes.  The more stable budgetary 
policy is, the less likely it will be that the initial budget plans will be subsequently overturned 
by parliament.  In addition,  institutional arrangements which limit the number of admissible 
amendments  to budgetary proposals and  require rigid  implementation procedures will  also 
7  See Alesina and Perotti (1994) for a discussion and review of the evidence and its consistency with 
the  various  models.  The  other  four  politico-economic  models  examined  are  that  based  on 
opportunistic  policy-makers  and  voters  suffering  from  "fiscal  illusion";  models  based  on 
intergenerational  redistribution;  models  based  on  strategic  incentives  of today's  government  to 
burden future  governments with fiscal imbalances;  and models based on geographically dispersed 
interest and "pork barrel" politics. (2) 
-5-
contribute to fiscal discipline.  de Haan, Sterks and de Kam (1992) also find support for these 
vtews. 
With specific reference to the Community experience, von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and 
Harden ( 1994)  argue that budgetary procedures and  institutions  play  an important role  in 
determining fiscal outcomes.  Fiscal consolidation requires that some form of commitment be 
adopted, which may take either the form of a specific numerical fiscal target or the form of a 
commitment procedure which elevates the objectives of sound public finances  to a primary 
position in the administration.  They find  support for a hypothesis postulating that structural 
characteristics in the budgetary process enhance fiscal  stability.  Specifically,  this  structural 
hypothesis  argues  that  budget  procedures  which  give  the  prime  minister  or  the  finance 
minister  a role  of strategic  dominance  over  spending  ministers,  which  limit  the  amending 
power  of parliament,  and  which  impose  restraints  in  the  execution  of the  budget,  are 
conducive to fiscal  discipline.  The underlying rationale is that while spending ministers are 
prone  to  support  increases  in  public  expenditure,  with  correspondingly  large  deficits 
consequences,  actors in  strategic  dominance  can  limit  this  tendency  by  defending  fiscally 
responsible  strategies  against  political  pressures  arising  from  the  day-to-day  political 
discourse. 
von Hagen and  Harden ( 1994)  also  find  a particular pattern of fiscal  experience  emerging 
across  the  Community.  In  the  large  European  states  where  fiscal  discipline  has  been 
maintained, the government has adopted a procedural commitment technology;  this applies 
to the UK,  France and  Germany.  On the  other hand,  in the  smaller European states this 
commitment has taken the form of a specific numerical fiscal target, as can be seen from the 
experience of Denmark and Luxembourg.  A mixture of commitment technologies has been 
used by the Netherlands, a medium-size Community state.  While no  immediate explanation 
for  this  pattern  can  be  invoked,  von  Hagen  and  Harden  speculate  that  the  size  of the 
economy, which is correlated both with the complexity of administrative tasks,  and with the 
heterogeneity  and  diversity  of special  interests  exercizing  influence  on  the  government, 
appears  to  favour  procedural  rather  than  numerical  discipline  technologies.  These 
considerations are clearly relevant for the choice of the appropriate commitment mechanism 
to effect fiscal consolidation in the Member States. 
On the other hand,  von Hagen (1992) finds  less  support for the hypothesis that long-term 
fiscal constraints alone strengthen fiscal discipline.  Instead, he finds that such constraints are 
effective  when  supported  by  effective  commitment  mechanisms  in  the  budgetary  process. 
Fiscal  performance  may  improve  in  countries where  disciplined  budget  procedures  are  in 
place;  on the other hand,  such restraints will  be inadequate in overcoming fiscal  discipline 
problems when budget procedures  are  not rigorous.  von Hagen and  Harden ( 1994)  also 
found that countries ranking high in terms of the long-term constraint criterion have better 
fiscal outcomes than those ranking low. 
The evidence reviewed by Alesina and Perotti (1994) is inconsistent with the purely economic 
model of  fiscal policy.  According to the tax smoothing hypothesis, the intertemporal budget 
constraint determines the path of taxation;  taxation is  assumed to be  set in  an  optimizing 
manner  in  order  to  equalize  the  present  value  of an  exogenously  determined  stream  of 
expenditure with the present value of taxation.  Taxes are set so  that the excess burden of -6-
taxation is minimized for a given path of  expenditure, and budget deficits and surpluses act as 
buffer  mechanisms,  emerging  when  spending  is  temporarily  high  or  temporarily  low, 
respectively.  This model is unable to explain either the persistence of  fiscal imbalances in the 
post-1975  period,  or the  distribution  of public  indebtedness  across  different  countries. 
Rather, the data support a politico-economic model of  fiscal policy. 
The model underlying the fiscal  data has important implications for the possibility of fiscal 
adjustment.  There is no unanimity on how feasible  fiscal  adjustment is  in general,  or how 
effective different fiscal  adjustment strategies are,  and the history of fiscal  disequilibrium in 
the Community provides evidence that democratic governments are reluctant to correct fiscal 
imbalances  in  a  durable  manner.  Since  the beginning  of the  1980s two models  of fiscal 
strategies may be identified:  the Reagan model, according to which reductions (increases) in 
taxation was expected to lead to reductions (increases) in spending;  and the Thatcher-Kohl 
model  according  to  which  reductions  in  spending  are  prerequisites  for  making  possible 
reductions  in  taxation8•  These  strategies  imply  specific  causality  notions,  running  from 
taxation  to  expenditure  in  the  Reagan  model,  and  from  expenditure  to  taxation  in  the 
Thatcher-Kohl model.  Furthermore, von Hagen (1992) attributes a crucial role to domestic 
institutions and policies when he finds  that fiscal policies in the Community,  as  depicted by 
the time  series  of government  deficits,  public  debt,  and  public  spending,  reflect  country-
specific  reactions  to  common  shocks.  As  a  result,  inter-country  differences  in  fiscal 
performance could be accounted for by differences in fiscal institutions and procedures which 
shape the response of  each Member State to these shocks.  How feasible fiscal adjustment is 
will depend on the nature of  this response. 
According to some views,  especially associated with Milton Friedman9,  raising taxation to 
reduce  government  deficits  would  be  ineffective  simply  because  the  availability  of higher 
revenues will lead to correspondingly higher expenditure.  The underlying cause of  the deficit 
is  the level of government spending which,  in tum,  determines the level of taxation or the 
level of  borrowing;  increased taxation is the causal mechanism through which the growth of 
the government is effected.  Because higher taxation will have no impact on the deficit, fiscal 
adjustment through tax increases is not possible.  On the other hand, lowering taxation may 
j 
not lead to lower expenditure but to an increase in the deficit,  as the Reagan supply-side tax 
policies have shown.  US  fiscal data at the federal level provide support for the hypothesis 
postulating  causality from  revenues  to government  expenditure  (see  Manage  and  Marlow 
(1986),  Blackley  (1986),  Ram  (1988a),  Bohn  (1991),  Joulfain  and  Mookerjee  (1991)), 
although there is no consensus on this matter (see von Furstenberg et.  al.  (1985,  1986), and 
Anderson, Wallace and Warner (1986), for the opposite conclusion, and Hoover and Sheffiin 
(1992) who suggest that causality from revenue to expenditure characterizes the pre-1960 
data;  subsequently, the two variables are independent). 
8 
9 
See von Furstenberg et.  al.  (1985) for a discussion of the political economy of this issue.  See also 
Pommerehne and Feld (1994), and Rajah and Smith (1994) for a discussion of fiscal policy in the 
post-1980 period in Germany and in the UK, respectively. 
Anderson, Wallace, and Warner (1986) review these hypotheses with particular reference to the US 
experience.  Another version of  this hypothesis was articulated by President Calvin Coolidge's saying 
that "nothing is easier than spending public money;  it does not appear to belong to anybody;  the 
temptation is overwhelming to bestow it to somebody" (quoted in von Furstenberg et.  al.  (1985), p. 
323). -7-
The public choice school,  associated with J.  Buchanan and R.  Wagner10,  contends that the 
composition of taxation has implications for government spending.  Visible  direct taxation 
constrains government spending since voters observe directly the cost of  government services 
provided through public expenditure while the benefits are more diffuse11.  This constraint 
effectively  provides  an  incentive  for  governments  to  resort  to  indirect  taxation  and  to 
inflationary  finance  to  finance  expenditure.  Fiscal  illusioned  voters  fail  to  completely 
internalize the cost of  these tax policies, which take the form of  higher interest rates through 
crowding-out phenomena and of  higher inflation, and which are alternative to direct taxation. 
As  consequence of these policies the stability of the private economy is undermined;  such 
instability, in tum, gives rise to demands by the electorate that the government intervenes and, 
thus,  it  provides  an  incentive  for  the  government  to  grow.  In  this  model,  where  the 
government has an incentive to increase in size, fiscal adjustment may not be feasible12. 
Finally,  Barro has argued that the causality runs from higher spending to higher taxation13. 
Voters are viewed as not suffering from fiscal illusion;  rather, they are assumed to recognize 
that the current level of debt-financed expenditure ultimately implies an increase in current or 
future  taxation  and,  therefore,  it  is  implicitly  suggested  that  expenditure  changes  cause 
corresponding (contemporaneous or future) revenue changes.  As government bonds are not 
regarded  as  part of net wealth,  the  private  sector capitalizes  this  expectation and  adjusts 
accordingly its level  of spending.  The Barro model  offers  the least possibilities  for fiscal 
adjustment.  Although the model does not determine the size of the government, it implies 
that a permanent reduction in  public  spending will  ultimately  be  accompanied by  revenue 
reductions  and  by  an increase in  private  spending  associated  with the expected  decline  in 
taxation and the rise in permanent income;  thus, fiscal policy will have no impact on the level 
of  economic activity and no impact on the level of  the fiscal deficit. 
Ill. Causality Tests on Revenues and Expenditure: General Remarks 
One  way  to  establish  the  nature  of fiscal  policy  is  to  examine  the  relationship  between 
revenues and expenditure in the framework of Granger causality.  This framework, while not 
imposing any priors about the  determination of the variables and while not testing directly 
10 
11 
12 
13 
See Buchanan and Wagner (1978). 
It could now be argued, however, that such public expenditure illusion is less prevalent, as shown by 
the  popularity  of privatization,  and  the  emphasis  on  expenditure  reduction,  policies  in several 
Member States. 
Another class of models where fiscal illusion or incomplete information play an important role in 
fiscal performance is that of the political business cycles.  These models predict that pre-election 
expansionary policies will be reversed in the post  -election period and that deficits will be larger in 
election years.  Expansionary policies may take the form of easing of monetary policy or of  increased 
expenditure and/or tax reductions.  Whether the expansionary policy is completely or incompletely 
reversed will determine the extent to which electoral cycles lead to rising deficits.  See Schuknecht 
(1994) for a discussion of  the literature and some evidence drawn from developing countries. 
See Barro (1974) and Barro (1978). -8-
behaviour-based  hypotheses,  it  allows  the  data  to  discriminate  between  the  history  of 
individual time  series according to their ability to predict the  current value of government 
revenues and expenditure.  While the results of such test are generally consistent with more 
than  one  hypotheses,  they  also  provide  an  objective  statistical  base  to  form  empirical 
judgements about the correlations underlying the fiscal variables.  As will be seen, this venue 
offers some surprising insights into the determination of  fiscal policy in the Community. 
The empirical methodology used to disentangle the relationship between general government 
revenues and expenditure in the 13 Community Member States is the Granger-causality tests. 
This methodology imposes no structure on the underlying relationship generating the data but 
it permits a free estimation of the cause and effect pattern, if any,  in the relationship under 
investigation.  The lack of structural information is generally a drawback when one attempts 
to interpret the results of causality tests.  However, it is  often possible to extract meaning 
from results which are consistent with structural relationships even if  this would not substitute 
for exact structural econometric analysis14. 
The Granger causality tests exploits the underlying correlations of the data without imposing 
priors on the structure of the relationship in question.  This implies that the correlations are 
viewed as "facts" generated by the time series which can be used to complement information 
from structural models on the structure of the economy.  The advantage of this approach is 
that it is not necessary to specify the complex structure of the economy or to state which 
variables are treated as exogenous in the information set15. 
Variable X is said to Granger-cause variable Y if variable Y can be predicted better by past 
values ofvariable X andY rather than by past values ofY alone.  If  X is found to Granger-
cause Y then the information contained in X should be used in optimal forecasts of Y.  In 
effect,  this  amounts  to  minimizing  the  forecasting  variance  of X  conditional  upon  the 
information set.  Hence, Granger  -causality is distinguished from normal causality in that it is 
simply a statistical property reflecting the information content of  the data. 
The underlying hypotheses tested here are: 
14 
15 
Causality hypothesis: 
From revenues (R) to expenditure (X) 
From expenditure (X) to revenues (R) 
From expenditure (X) to the fiscal balance (F) 
From revenues (R) to the fiscal balance (F) 
From revenues (R) to expenditure (X) and from 
expenditure (X) to revenues (R) 
No causality from either variable 
Causality structure 
Uni-directional 
Uni-directional 
Uni-directional 
Uni-directional 
Bi-directional 
Independent 
See Sims (1980) who discusses extensively many of these issues, and Zellner (1979) on the concept 
of causality in philosophy and in science as  well as the comments of his discussants in the same 
volume. 
A disadvantage  of this approach is,  of course,  that it does  not discriminate between the various 
hypotheses discussed previously in section II. -9-
In terms of  the minimization of  the forecast variance, the first hypothesis requires that a2 (X I 
IX, IR) < a
2 (X I IX), where a2 is the variance of  the forecast error of X (or R,  depending on 
the hypothesis) conditional upon the lagged values of expenditure (IX) and of revenues (IR); 
the second hypothesis requires that a2 (R I lR, IX) < a2 (R I IR);  the third hypothesis requires 
that 0
2 (X I IX) < a2 (X I IX, IR) and a2 (R I IR) < a2 (X I IX, IR) hold simultaneously;  finally, 
the fourth hypothesis implies that a2 (X I IX) < a2 (X I IX,  IR) and that a2  (R I IR) < a2  (R I 
lR, IX).  Similar observations apply to causality tests involving the fiscal balance. 
Each hypothesis about the causality structure of government spending and revenues has its 
own implications:  if causality  is  found  to  be  running  from  expenditure  to revenues,  the 
government may be seen as  setting expenditure objectives and  subsequently establishing the 
revenue  needs  to  meet  these  spending  commitments.  If causality  is  found  to  run  from 
revenues to expenditure, it is possible to argue that the government undertakes spending only 
when  revenues  are  available;  revenue  availability  in  this  case  may  be  thought  of as 
constraining  spending  (or as  making  possible  expenditure reductions).  In the case  of bi-
directional  causality government  revenues  and  expenditure  are  simultaneously  determined. 
Finally, it is possible that no causality exists between the series. 
It is  also  evident that if causality is  uni-directional,  running  from  expenditure to revenues, 
then fiscal  consolidation,  holding revenues constant,  requires  expenditure control.  On the 
other hand,  if revenues are found to determine expenditure,  then fiscal  adjustment through 
revenue increases could lead to expenditure increases too, implying also that the deficit may 
not  be  reduced  unless  the  causal  link  is  broken.  The  least  propitious  case  for  fiscal 
consolidation is that of  bi-directional causality running from revenues to public spending;  the 
most propitious is that where no causality can be found between government expenditure and 
revenues  so  that  decisions  on either  variable  does  not have  implications  for  each  other. 
Finally, note that if the deficit generating process is independent of  the processes generating 
the  revenue  and  expenditure  profiles,  as  von Hagen ( I992)  and  von Hagen  and  Harden 
( I994)  have  argued,  structural  and  institutional  factors  determine  fiscal  performance,  and 
these same factors will be decisive in determining the feasibility of  fiscal adjustment. 
IV.  Specification of the Granger-Causality Tests and Testing Procedure 
The basic bivariate model used in the causality tests has the following general form: 
(I) 
and 
(2) 
where Y and X are the variables in question, a II, a 12, and b 1I, b 12 are coefficient vectors, a 
and bare coefficients, hand g indicate the length of  the lags in equation (1), k and m indicate -10-
the length of  the lags in equation (2), and E and 8 are error terms, where Et,..., iid (0, aE2) and 
et,..., iid (0,  ae2).  Note further that L is the lag operator, such that z*(L~Dt = Z} *Dt-1  + 
z2*Dt-2 + ... + Zj*Dt-}  Variables Y and X are assumed to be stationary. 
It is clear from (I) and (2) that Y and X are jointly determined endogenous variables.  The 
reduced form of  the system presented by equations (1) and (2) is: 
(3) 
and 
(4) 
where c 11, c 12, d 11, and d 12 are vectors of coefficients,  ~' A.,  c,  and  ~ represent the lags in 
question, and u1  and u2 are error terms such that E(ulJ!,u2v) = 0 for all  J!  -:1=  v.  It is evident 
that this  condition  allows  for  the  possibility  that the  error terms  are  contemporaneously 
correlated, so that shocks in X (Y) affect both X (Y) andY (X).  As seen in equation (3), X 
is now affected only by past values of X  and Y,  captured by  the polynomials  c 11 (L) and 
c 12(L  ).  Past  errors  are  uncorrelated  with  contemporaneous  errors  while  the 
contemporaneous value ofY does not enter equation (3).  Similarly, from equation (4) it can 
be  seen that the contemporaneous value  of X  does  not  enter the  equation  and  that,  by 
hypothesis, contemporaneous and past errors are uncorrelated.  The contemporaneous effect 
of Y  on  X  will  be  captured  through  the  contemporaneous  error  correlation,  and  any 
contemporaneous effect of  X on y, will hlso be captured by the contemporaneous correlation 
of  the error terms. 
The Granger-causality tests are sensitive to the specification of  the information set as well as 
to the specification of  the lag structure.  While with regard to the former only a well-specified 
structural model would  provide  the  answer to  the  question  of the  exact  variables  to be 
included in the V  AR.s.  With regard to the latter, two test procedures can be used to identify 
the model.  The first is a variable exclusion test which is based on the null hypothesis that the 
set of  coefficients c12(L)A in equation (3) is jointly equal to zero;  if  the null hypothesis can 
be rejected, then Y Granger-causes X.  Similarly, in equation (4) the null hypothesis is that 
the set of coefficients dll(L)C is jointly equal to zero;  if this hypothesis is rejected, then X 
Granger-causes Y.  In either case, the causality is uni-directional, or causality runs from the 
variable in question to the dependent variable. 
The correct lag structure is a crucial determinant of the quality of the tests since too short 
lags would effectively yield biased coefficient estimates and the test results would be invalid. 
On the other hand, too long lags, while they would produce unbiased coefficient estimates, 
the  estimates  would  be  inefficient  and  one  would  be  unable  to  discriminate  between 
competing hypotheses.  Further, if the model is  specified in such a way that each variable 
impinges on every other variable with the same lag structure, the number of  parameters to be 
estimated increases by the square of  the number of  variables and it is possible that the degrees - 11-
of  freedom are either severely restricted or entirely exhausted.  In general, there is no a priori 
guide to the selection of the lags except that the theory suggests that all past values of the 
variables  affect  the  current  value  and,  therefore,  an  empirical  measure  must  be  devised. 
Presently, the Akaike final prediction error (FPE) criterion is used to identify the model16. 
If in each reduced form equation neither set of coefficients is jointly equal to zero, then bi-
directional causality is present, with X 
11Causing
11  Y andY 
11Causing
11  X. 
Clearly, if  neither null hypothesis can be rejected then the series are independent of the each 
other and no causality is present in the data. 
The variable exclusion tests yield a likelihood ratio statistic distributed as x
2
, and an F statistic 
distributed with degrees of freedom according to the number of the exclusion restrictions in 
the  numerator  and  the  number  of observations  minus  the  number  of regressors  in  the 
denominator.  If the calculated statistics are greater (less) than the critical values,  the null 
hypothesis is  rejected (not rejected) and the excluded variable is  said to (not to) Granger-
cause the dependent variable. 
As noted previously,  the Akaike final  prediction error (FPE)  criterion is used  as  a model 
selection  test.  This  test  aims  at  identifying  the  model  by  trading-off bias  in  coefficient 
estimates  associated  with  a  parsimonious  model  against  the inefficiency  arising  from  the 
overparametrization of  long lags. 
The Akaike FPE criterion is defined as: 
FPE(cp,tlJ) = {(T +  cp +tV+ 1)/(T- cp- tV- l)}*{SSR/T}  (5) 
where cp and '4' are the lag lengths, T is the number of  observations, and S  SR is the regression 
sum of  squared residuals.  It  is evident that the first term in (5) is a measure of  the estimation 
error and the second term a measure of  the modelling error.  Unlike standard statistical tests 
which  are  specific  to  a  given  ad  hoc  level  of significance,  the  FPE  is  based  on  the 
minimization of  the mean square prediction error17. 
16 
17 
An alternative way to identify the model is to  use the Guilkey and Salemi (1982)  experimental 
evidence on the small sample properties of the Granger causal ordering.  They suggest that lag 
lengths of six to eight quarters in quarterly estimates,  or three to four years in annual data,  are 
appropriate.  They also find that shorter lags provide better versions of  the estimates than longer lags. 
Ram (1988a) uses this methodology in his causality tests. 
Note that the FPE itself can be used as a vehicle to perform Granger-causality tests.  Use of  the FPE 
to identify the model in this case involves the following steps:  (i) Estimate a one-dimensional V  AR 
X process and determine the lag order with the use of the FPE;  (ii) adding Y as an independent 
variable, estimate an equation such as (3) using Y as the manipulated variable to determine the lag 
length on Y according to the FPE;  (iii) compare the smallest value of  the FPE from step (i) with its 
value from step (ii);  if  the former is greater than the latter, then Y is said to cause X;  if  the former is 
smaller than the latter, then X is an independent process;  (iv) repeat steps (i) - (ii) with X as the 
manipulated variable;  (v) combine steps (i) to (iv) to identify the model.  This method is also used in - 12-
V.  Causality Results for Government Expenditure and Revenues 
Reduced form bivariate equations for budget revenue and expenditure, as those presented in 
equations  (1)  and  (2),  for  thirteen Community  Member  States were used  to  evaluate the 
causality structure of  the data for the period 1960-94.  The data, whose time-series properties 
are  discussed in  Annex I,  are  in  absolute value  and  in  nominal  terms,  and  comprise total 
general government revenues and total general government expenditure including net capital 
transfers.  The latter is the broadest possible concept for approximating the presence of the 
government in the economy.  The data, therefore, present the most encompassing concepts of 
spending and receipts at the level of  the general government.  Nominal rather than inflation-
adjusted  data were used  since  budgetary exercises  are  generally  defined  in current values. 
The  data  periodicity  is  annual,  dictated  by  availability;  in  addition,  annual  data  are 
appropriate since budgetary exercises are principally annual in nature.  The model used is a 
bivariate  vector  autoregressive  model,  defined  over  general  government  revenues  and 
expenditure18.  To  satisfy  the  stationarity  requirement,  the  model  was  specified  in  first 
difference form and, in the cases ofPortugal and of  the UK, second-difference, form. 
The results are reported in Tables  1 and  2.  The lag  structure was determined through the 
minimization of the FPE criterion.  The FPE values reported in the Tables are the minimum 
values  following  a  grid  search  on  the  appropriate  lag  structure  on  the  right-hand  side 
variables.  In general,  the  lag  structure  adopted  in  the  estimation  is  consistent  with the 
Guilkey and Salemi (1982) suggestion19.  The F-statistic is the measured F-statistic associated 
with the restriction that the coefficients of  lagged values of  the expenditure variable in Table 1 
(revenue variable in Table  2)  are jointly equal to zero.  LR is  the likelihood  ratio  statistic 
associated with the same restriction. 
In Table  1,  the hypothesis that causality is  running from revenues to expenditure is  tested. 
This postulated version of causality is consistent with Friedman's views as noted previously. 
The results  suggest that in the majority of cases under review,  in ten Member  States,  the 
hypothesis finds  substantial  support.  In these cases,  the  size  of government is  principally 
determined by resource (tax revenue) availability.  In five cases (Germany, Spain, Portugal, 
18 
19 
section  VI  below.  See  Hsiao  (1979)  for  the use  of this  test,  and  Hsiao  (1981)  for  a  concise 
application.  Anderson, Wallace, and Warner (1986) also use this procedure in their review of the 
causality structure of  the US federal budget data. 
As  a caveat to the results reported and discussed in the present and in the following sections, it 
should be noted that a bivariate model may not identify precisely the causal relationship if  a higher-
dimension model is appropriate.  The present model could be extended in this respect to include 
other potentially relevant variables such as the output gap, inflation, demographic trends and socio-
economic variables, and it may also be essential to use cyclically adjusted rather than current data. 
The elemental  model  adopted presently,  which is  also  common in the literature,  is intended to 
provide  some  initial  results  before  more  complicated  V  ARs  are  considered;  it  also  facilitates 
comparisons with results obtained elsewhere with a similar model.  However, given that the results 
are sensitive to model specification, the conclusions drawn here cannot be generalized since they are 
only specific to the bivariate model used.  An incomplete summary table of various models used in 
this literature is provided in Bella and Quintieri (no date). 
See footnote 16. (3) 
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Table 1  Table 2 
Granger-Causality Tests: From Revenues to  Granger-Causality Tests: From Expenditure to 
Expenditure,  Revenues, 
13 Community Member States  13 Community Member States 
(Dependent variable: First-difference in  (Dependent variable: First-difference in 
government expenditure)  revenues) 
Lagl  F(df)  LR(X2)  FPE  Lagl  F(df)  LR(x2)  FPE 
B  2, 1  9.68 (1, 28)+  9.50 (1)*  0.119  B  2,3  2.25 (3, 25)  7.28 (3)  0.166 
DK  1, 1  0.98 (1, 30)  1.06 (1)  0.046  DK  4,4  13.22 (4, 21)*  37.74 (4)*  0.189 
D  2,2  12.71 (2, 27)*  21.23 (2)*  0.314  D  2,3  8.61 (3, 25)*  22.00 (3)*  0.260 
GR2  3,4  4.64 (4, 8)+  19.20 (4)*  0.118 
E3  2,2  18.14 (2, 17)*  25.13 (2)*  92.38 
F  2,2  4.53 (2, 27)+  9.27 (2)*  1.104 
IRL  4,4  4.06 (2, 21)+  17.17 (4)*  0.068 
GR2  2,4  23.19 (4, 11)*  40.40 (4)*  0.542 
E3  1, 2  4.20 (2, 18/  8.42 (2)+  26.08 
F  3,4  3.86 (4, 22)+  15.94 (4)*  0.666 
IRL  2,2  3.12 (2, 27)  6.46 (2)+  0.035 
I  1, 3  4.61 (3, 26)+  13.21 (3)*  1254  I  3, 1  0.52 (1, 26)  0.61 (1)  901.83 
NL  2,2  2.76 (2, 27)  5.95 (2)  0.146 
p4  3,4  8.63 (  4, 20)*  28.09 (4)*  0.516 
UK4  1, 1  0.66 (1, 27)  0.72 (1)  0.015 
NL  1, 2  13.95 (2, 28)*  22.12 (2)*  0.157 
p4  2,3  27.98 (3, 22)*  44.02 (3)*  0.319 
UK4  6,6  2.55 (5, 15)  16.00 (5)*  0.007 
A  3,3  23.18 (3, 24)*  42.17 (3)*  0.449  A  2,3  2.15 (3, 25)  7.12 (3)  0.144 
SF  3, 2  23.40 (2, 25)*  32.71 (2)*  0.078  SF  4,4  1.95 (4, 21)  9.45 (4)  0.034 
df= Degrees offreedom 
LR = Likelihood ratio statistic, distributed as '1.2 ( df) 
FPE =Final prediction error (Akaik.e) statistic, x10""2 
df  = Degrees of  freedom 
LR = Likelihood ratio statistic, distributed as '1.2  ( df) 
FPE =  Final prediction error (  Akaik.e) statistic, xl  0""2 
1 The first lag applies to the expenditure variable; the second,  1 The first lag applies to the revenue variable; the second, to 
to the revenue variable;  2  Sample 1975-1994, total current  the expenditure variable;  2  Sample 1975-1994, total current 
expenditure ;  3  Sample  1971-1994;  4  Second difference  expenditure;  3  Sample  1971-1994;  4  Second  difference 
equation  equation 
+ Significant at the 95% level;  * Significant at the 99% level  + Significant at the 95% level;  *  Significant at the 99% level 
Austria, and Finland), the hypothesis that the vector of  the coefficients of  the lagged values of 
revenues is jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 99% level of significance.  In another five 
cases (Belgium, Greece, France, Ireland, and Italy), the hypothesis of causality running from 
revenues to expenditure cannot be rejected at the 95% level of  significance.  According to the 
likelihood ratio test, the zero restriction on the coefficients of  the revenue variables is rejected 
at the  99  %  level  of significance.  In the  remaining  three Member  States  (Denmark,  the 
Netherlands, and the UK), revenues do not contribute to the explanation of  the current-period 
value of  government expenditure since the null hypothesis of  non-causality cannot be rejected 
at conventional significance levels. 
Reversing the hypothesis to test causality running from  expenditure to revenues yields  the 
results reported in Table 2.  According to the F-statistic, in seven Member States (Denmark, 
Germany,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  and  Portugal)  the  hypothesized  causality  is 
supported by the data.  In five Member States (Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, 
and Portugal) causality is supported at the 99% level of significance.  In the cases of Spain 
and France the hypothesis is supported at the 95% level of  significance.  In the remaining six 
Member States there is no support for causality running from public expenditure to revenues. On the other hand,  the likelihood  ratio 
test offers support for the hypothesis in a 
total of nine cases, with Ireland and the 
UK  added  to  the  group  of  seven 
suggested by the F test. 
The  results  of the  causality  tests  are 
summarized in Table 3.  Causality is bi-
directional in five cases, and perhaps six, 
cases if  the UK is included in this group. 
Causality is uni-directional, running from 
revenues to government expenditure,  in 
the  cases  of Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Austria  and  Finland,  while  in Denmark 
and  the  Netherlands  causality  is  uni-
directional  running  from  government 
expenditure  to  revenues.  For 
comparative  purposes,  note  that  Ram 
(1988b), using a sample stating in 1960 
and  ending in the mid-1980s,  finds  uni-
directional causality from expenditure to 
revenues in the cases of Greece, Ireland, 
and Finland,  and bi-directional causality 
in the case of  the UK alone;  he finds no 
evidence  of  causality  running  from 
revenue  to  expenditure  in  the 
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Table3 
Results of the Granger-Causality Tests 
Summary 
From  From 
Expenditure  Revenues to  Structure 
to Revenues  Expenditure  of  Causality 
B  No  Yes  u 
DK  Yes  No  u 
D  Yes  Yes  B 
GR  Yes  Yes?  B? 
E  Yes  Yes  B 
F  Yes  Yes  B 
IRL  No  Yes  u 
I  No  Yes  u 
NL  Yes  No  u 
p  Yes  Yes  B 
UK  No  No  I 
A  No  Yes  u 
SF  No  Yes  u 
B =  Bi-directional 
U =  Uni-directional 
I =  Independent 
Community nations he included in his investigation.  It is likely, however, that his results are 
pertinent  to  the  shorter  sample  used  in  his  estimation,  and  they  are  also  reflecting  the 
influence of the Guilkey and Salemi (1982) model identification method used.  It is evident 
that  the  longer  sample  used  here  and  the  alternative  model  identification  methodology, 
produce different and, presently, greater support for the causality hypothesis, results. 
The bi-directional causality characterizing the five Member States shown in Table 3 appears 
to be consistent with the prediction of Barro's (1978) model, that expenditure is a cause of 
government  revenues.  Barro's  model  implies  that  current  debt-finance  expenditure  will 
induce the private economy to adjust its spending to reflect the incipient increase in liabilities 
associated with the increased deficit and, therefore, the long-run expenditure multiplier will be 
unity, since starting from a balanced budget an increase in expenditure would ultimately give 
rise to revenues to finance it.  This prediction is  tested for the cases where causality from 
government expenditure to budget revenues is found.  The value of  the multiplier, m (X), is 
presented in Table 420 together with the Wald statistic testing the restriction.  The estimates 
20  The multipliers are based on the model (1-A)*X =  B*Y, where A is the coefficient vector on the 
lagged dependent variable, X, and B is the coefficient vector on the lagged values of  the independent 
variable, Y.  In the long-run, where current and lagged values of  the variables are the same, the value 
of the multiplier is m  = B/(1-A).  These  estimates  are  shown in Table  4.  Note  also  that the 
cointegration relationships underlying the data, as reported in Annex I, provide comparable estimates 
for the long-run expenditure and revenue multipliers which are presented in Annex I, Table A3. -15-
provide  some  support  to  Barra's  model. 
The long-run multiplier in four of the seven 
cases  (Denmark,  Germany,  France  and 
Portugal)  is  not  statistically  different  from 
unity,  but  in  the  remaining  cases  the 
restriction  is  rejected  by  the  data.  In  the 
four  cases  where  the  restnctton  is 
supported,  the  implication  is  that  starting 
from  a  balanced  budget  position  an 
expenditure shock will ultimately lead to an 
equivalent increase in  revenues  so  that the 
balanced budget is restored, even though, as 
a  result,  the  level  of taxation  will  have 
increased.  In  the  remaining  cases,  an 
expenditure shock will ultimately cause the 
deficit  to  increase,  even  though  revenues 
will  also  increase  but  by  less  than  the 
increase  in  expenditure;  the  multiplier  is 
statistically  different  from,  and  less  than, 
unity.  Finally,  the  estimate  for  Portugal 
suggests  that expenditure  shocks  may  lead 
to a reduction in the deficit since they more 
than  raise  revenues  in  the  long  run;  the 
point estimate for  the multiplier,  while  not 
statistically different from unity,  is  equal to 
1.1521. 
Table4 
Long-Run Expenditure and Revenue 
Multipliers 
Wald  Wald 
m(X)  x2(1)  m(R)  .rJI) 
B  - - 0.92  0.24 
DK  1.08  1.09  -
D  0.93  4.85  0.99  0.02 
GR  0.72  43.32  0.76  156.5 
E  0.51  5.17  1.10  1.77 
F  1.00  0.00  0.83  2.42 
IR.L  - - 0.83  0.48 
I  - - 1.00  0.00 
NL  0.74  11.70  - -
p  1.15  0.35  0.99  0.00 
A  - - 1.05  0.47 
SF  - - 1.09  0.18 
m  (X)  = expenditure  multiplier,  m  (R)  = 
revenue multiplier 
The critical value of the ?e(I) statistic is 3.84 
at the 95%  level of significance,  and 6.63  at 
the 99% level of  significance 
While no priors may exist which predict the value of  the long-run revenue multiplier (that is, 
the  long-term  increase  in  expenditure  in  response  to  a  unit  shock  in  revenues)  it  is 
nevertheless important to consider the estimates implicit in  the Granger-causality equations 
because they have implications for fiscal performance.  This multiplier is reported in Table 4 
as m(R), together with the W  aid statistic testing the restriction that its long-run value is unity. 
This  restriction,  if satisfied,  would imply  that Friedman's  concerns,  that  revenue  increases 
ultimately lead to expenditure increases, are legitimate and that they find  support in the data. 
The test is applied to those cases where there is either uni-directional causality from revenues 
to expenditure, or where causality is bi-directional, also from revenues to expenditure.  The 
results suggest that in nine of the ten cases reported in the Table the unit revenue multiplier 
restriction is  supported by the data.  With the exception of Greece,  where the sample  size 
leaves doubts about the quality of the estimates and where the restriction is  rejected, in all 
other cases revenue increases are ultimately accompanied by  equivalent increases in public 
spending.  In Spain's case, taking the two multipliers together, the results suggest an inherent 
21  It is possible that the multiplier estimates reported here do not reflect Barro's Ricardian behaviour on 
the part of  the private sector but simply a government reaction to expenditure shocks.  According to 
this  interpretation,  the  estimates  would  again  suggest  that  government  revenue  reaction  is  not 
commensurate to expenditure shocks in all those cases where the revenue  multiplier is less than 
unity, implying an inherent bias for budget deficits.  A discussion of  factors underlying this bias may 
be found, among many contributions to this issue, in Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b). -16-
bias for fiscal deficits22•  The point estimates for the multiplier range from a low of 0.83  to a 
high of 1.1 0;  these results imply that small deviations from the balanced budget position will 
be  observed  in  the  event  of revenue  shocks  and  they  cast  doubt  about  the  feasibility  of 
attaining fiscal consolidation through revenue increases alone. 
von  Hagen  (1992)  has  also  provided  Granger-causality  estimates  on  the  postulate  that 
government spending contributes to the prediction of net lending as  percent of GDP in the 
Community.  He finds that government spending does not Granger-cause the deficit in any of 
the twelve Member States except Italy, although some weak evidence was found in the cases 
of Ireland, the Netherlands,  and Portugal23.  He concludes that rising expenditure does not 
contribute to the prediction of the rise in government deficits and debt in the Community in 
the period up to 1990s and, furthermore, he argues that 
11there are no systematic relationships 
between relatively large deficits, large primary deficits, or large debt ratios and relatively large 
expenditure ratios.  Once again, this refutes the simple notion that large deficits or large debts 
are due to excessive spending  ..  (p. 23). 
The present results cast doubts at these findings.  The long-run multiplier in three (Greece, 
Spain,  and  the Netherlands)  of the  seven  cases  where  government  expenditure  Granger-
causes  revenues  is  less  than  unity  suggesting  that  starting  from  a  balanced  budget  an 
expenditure shock will lead to a deficit.  Consequently, expenditure ought to be found  as  a 
Granger-cause  of the  deficit  in these  countries.  It is  possible  that von Hagen's  result  is 
specific  to the  equation  tested  and  the  lag  structure  chosen,  since,  as  noted  previously, 
Granger-causality is sensitive to the model used.  This conclusion is tested more rigorously in 
the next section where the relationship between government expenditure,  revenues  and  the 
fiscal balance is investigated. 
VI.  Expenditure, Revenues, and Fiscal Performance in the Community 
Is excess government spending or revenue inadequacy, or both, the factors determining fiscal 
imbalances and fiscal performance in the Community?  While it is natural that either side of 
the budget may be  a contributing factor to fiscal  imbalances,  von Hagen's notion,  that it is 
primarily  the  budget  procedure  and  institutional  considerations  rather  than  the  paths  of 
revenues  and  expenditure  themselves  that  determine  fiscal  deficits,  deserves  examination. 
The framework of Granger  -causality is  employed once more to establish which side of the 
budget categories, revenues or expenditure, is the best predictor of  the path of  fiscal deficits 
in the Community. 
The methodology used to identify the model is based on the minimization of  the FPE value in 
a  sequential  regression  where,  first,  the  appropriate  lag  on  the  dependent  variable  was 
determined;  secondly, the appropriate lag, that is the lag that yields the minimum value of  the 
22 
23 
This has also been noted and confirmed by Gonzalez Paramo et. al. (1994) in a cointegration context 
of Granger-causality estimates.  Note also, in passing, that Blackley (1986) finds a long-term bias 
towards budget deficits in US federal budget data. 
See von Hagen (1992), p. 20-23. -17-
FPE  when  one  independent  variable  is 
added  in  the  equation,  was  determined; 
comparing the FPE values from these two 
processes it is possible to conclude that if 
the  former  is  lower  than  the  latter,  the 
dependent  variable  is  question  is  an 
independent  process;  if  the  latter  is 
smaller  than  the  former,  then  the 
independent  variable  Granger  -causes  the 
dependent variable24. 
Causality tests, using the current-value net 
borrowing of the general  government  as 
the dependent variable, were based on the 
following first-difference equation: 
(6) 
where ~  =  Xt - Xt-1  is the first-difference 
operator,  DF  is  the fiscal  balance  of the 
general  government  defined  as  the 
difference between total receipts and total 
expenditure, i =  1 to n,  H is the vector of 
the  total  expenditure  and  of the  total 
receipts variables,  j  =  1 to m,  and w is 
an idd error term. 
The  first-difference  specification  is 
warranted because the fiscal  variables  in 
all the Member States under consideration 
TableS 
Government Expenditure and Revenues as 
Predictors of the Fiscal Position: 
Granger-Causality Tests 
FPE Fiscal  FPE  FPE 
Balance  Expenditure  Revenues 
B  216.54 (1)  186.30 (2)*  192.78 (1)+ 
DK  0.84 (4)  0.89 (2)  0.89 (2) 
D  3.39 (2)  3.01 (1)*  3.01 (1)+ 
GR  20.0 (4)  4.23 (3)*  4.42 (3)+ 
E  3511.4 (4)  3169.4 (1)*  3169.4 (1)+ 
F  1120.9 (4)  1091.5 (4)*  1091.5 (4)+ 
IRL  0.041 (2)  0.044 (2)  0.044 (2) 
I  0.425 (3)  2.893 (3)  3.011 (4) 
NL  0.136(1)  0.136 (2)  0.129 (2)+ 
pl  39.142 (5)  0.314 (6)*  0.280 (6)+ 
Ul(l  0.097 (4)  0.102 (3)  0.102 (3) 
A  1.520 (2)  1.231 (2)*  1.231 (2)+ 
SF  0.222 (6)  0.157 (6)*  0.157 (6)+ 
*Expenditure Granger-causes the fiscal position 
+ Revenues Granger-cause the fiscal position 
1 Second difference equation;  FPE =  x 10-2 
The  first  column reports  the minimwn value  of the 
FPE  for  the  one-dimensional  V  AR process  for  the 
fiscal balance variable alone (lag in parentheses); the 
second column reports the minimwn value of the FPE 
when only  the  expenditure  variable  is added to the 
fiscal balance equation;  the third column reports the 
minimwn value  of the  FPE  when  only  the  revenue 
variable is added in the equation. 
are  generally  non-stationary  as  1(0)  but  integrated  of order  one.  The  estimation  was 
performed on the 1960-94 sample, with the exception of Greece and  Spain where a shorter 
sample was available- see Tables 1 and 2 for the details.  The results are presented in Table 5. 
In several cases the data lend  support to von Hagen's findings.  Thus,  in Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, and the UK neither government expenditure nor government revenues. are predictors of 
the fiscal  deficit.  In these cases the smallest FPE on the autoregression of the dependent 
variable is less than that obtained when either the expenditure or the revenue variable are used 
as the manipulated variables;  in other words, the latter variables have no information content 
in  predicting  the  fiscal  balance.  In these  cases,  therefore,  the  fiscal  balance  process  is 
independent.  This  would  tend  to  support  von  Hagen's  contention  that  institutional  and 
structural factors are at the background of  the fiscal performance of  these Member States.  It 
is worth noting that for Italy von Hagen's structural indices are relatively low implying lesser 
24  See footnote 17 for a discussion of the use of the Akaike criterion in Granger-causality tests. -18-
fiscal discipline and worse fiscal performance than in the cases where the indices are high.  It 
is  surprising,  however,  that  for  the  Member  States  where  the  indices  have  large  values 
(Denmark and the UK) the fiscal process is found to be independent of the expenditure and 
revenue processes25. 
Results from eight Member States provide evidence of causality.  In the cases of Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Austria, and Finland both the expenditure and the revenue 
history dominate over the history of  the fiscal balance itself in predicting its current value.  In 
the case of Greece,  and noting the short sample,  the estimates support the hypothesis that 
government spending and government revenues separately predict the deficit better than the 
autoregression of  the deficit itself  Finally, in the case of  the Netherlands the revenue history 
dominates the history of  the fiscal balance in predicting the latter, even though, in a bivariate 
regression, the history of  government expenditure is as good a predictor of the fiscal balance 
as the history of  the fiscal balance itself 
These results provide partial refutation of  von Hagen's generalizations.  Fiscal imbalances are 
the result of  expenditure and of  revenue policies in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Portugal, Austria and Finland.  His hypothesis finds lesser support in our sample since in only 
four cases does the fiscal history itself,  as exemplified by the fiscal  balance, is the principal 
predictor of  the current value of  the fiscal position26. 
VII.  Do Fiscal Imbalances Increase Government Spending? 
An important issue  in  the  determination  of the  size  of the  government  is  Buchanan and 
Wagner's contention that fiscal deficits increase government spending.  In a mechanical sense, 
it is evident that debt service payments will,  ceteris paribus, contribute to raising government 
expenditure.  As noted in section II, however, the Buchanan and Wagner contention rests on 
the hypothesis that the  "true"  tax cost of the provision of government  services  is  hidden 
through the use of  public sector borrowing.  The current generation of  taxpayers, it is argued, 
does not perceive accurately this cost, and as a result, it supports expansion of government-
provided services.  For this hypothesis to hold it is  necessary that,  either individually or in 
combination, three conditions are satisfied27:  first, voters are not fully aware of  the future tax 
liabilities of current deficits28;  secondly, voters discount future tax liabilities at a rate higher 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See von Hagen (1992), p. 45-46. 
It is possible that respecting the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, which emphasize the deficit (and 
the debt)  as a  measure of fiscal  convergence,  will ultimately contribute to the dominance of the 
history of  the fiscal position over the other variables in predicting current fiscal imbalances for all the 
Member States. 
See Niskanen (1978). 
This may be due to the complexity of the tax system, or to the method by which the tax liability is 
assessed, or due to the frequency at which the tax liability has to be met as well as due to the timing 
at which the tax assessment and the payment are made.  Fiscal illusion could take either the form of 
underestimating, or of  overestimating, the tax burden and expenditure benefits. - 19-
than  the  rate  of interest  on  government 
debt;  and,  third,  voters  have  finite  lives 
and  they  value  future  tax  liabilities  less 
than  they  value  current  liabilities  falling 
due within their lifetimes.  The implication 
of these  conditions  is  that  there  exist 
incentives  which  make  possible  the 
enlargement of  the size of the government 
sector  through  budget  deficits  and  debt-
financed  expenditure  which  postpones 
taxation to the future.  Conditions which 
encourage the  growth of public  spending 
are typically those where vote-maximizing 
politicians  dominate  and,  as  a  result,  as 
Rogers and Rogers (1995) point out, fiscal 
deficits  are  a  natural  consequence  of 
political  competition.  While  this 
hypothesis  may  be  subject  to  dispute, 
Niskanen (1978) finds  that,  in the case of 
the  US,  the  data  support  the  notion  that 
federal  deficits  have  raised  government 
spending,  and  Rogers  and  Rogers  (1995) 
find  similar  support  at  the  state  level29. 
There  does  not  appear  to  be  much 
empirical  evidence  examining  the  fiscal 
illusion/political competition hypothesis on 
European data3o. 
Using  data  on  government  current 
Table 6 
Granger-Causality Tests: From Fiscal 
Imbalances to Government Spending, 
13 Community Member States 
(Dependent variable: First-difference in 
government expenditure) 
Lagl  F(dt)  LR(x2)  FPE 
B  2, 1  9.68 (1, 28)*  9.50 (1)*  0.123 
DK  1, 1  0.98 (1, 30)  1.06 (I)  0.006 
D  2,2  12.71 {2, 27)*  21.23 (2)*  3.266 
GR2  3,4  2.87 (4, 8)  14.24 (4)*  16.130 
E3  1, 2  18.68 {2, 18)*  24.72 (2)*  859.95 
F  1, 2  4.41 (2, 28)*  8.76 (2)*  1.038 
IRL  1, 4  3.62 (4, 23)  14.66 (4)  0.007 
I  3, 5  8. 86 (5, 20)+  33.87 (5)*  7000.0 
NL  2,4  1.48 (4, 23)  6.88 (4)  0.163 
p  6, 5  23.22 (5, 15)*  58.53 (5)*  1.196 
UK  1, 2  0.74 {2, 25)  1.66 (2)  0.0156 
A  3, 1  68.19 {1, 26)*  39.90 (1)*  0.445 
SF  3,2  23.40 (2, 25)*  32.71 (2)*  0.082 
df  = Degrees of freedom 
LR = Likelihood ratio statistic, distributed as x? (  dt) 
FPE =Final prediction error (Akaike) statistic, xl0""2 
1  The first lag applies to the expenditure variable; the second, 
to the fiscal balance variable;  2 Sample  1975-1994, total 
current expenditure; 3 Sample 1971-1994 
+  Significant at the 9  5% level;  *  Significant at the 99% level 
expenditure and revenues for the thirteen Community Member States, an attempt is made to 
establish the Granger-causality of  the fiscal position on government spending.  As previously, 
a  first-difference  equation  explaining  the  current  value  of total  general  govefhment 
expenditure as a function of its own history and the history of the fiscal  position is utilized. 
The lag structure on the dependent variable (government expenditure) is chosen on the basis 
of  the minimization of  the FPE;  the minimum value of  the FPE is again established through to 
determine the lag structure of  the independent variable (the fiscal position);  once the model is 
so identified, the restriction that the coefficients of  the independent variable are jointly equal 
29 
30 
Rogers and Rogers  (1985)  estimate a probit model where the probability for a  US  state of being 
identified according to the Granger-causal orderings established is defined as a function of  variables 
suggested by political competition theories and by fiscal illusion theories.  Rogers and Rogers utilize 
this probit model to explain the correlations identified by the causality regressions. 
An exception is  Pommerehne  and  Schneider  (1978)  who  examined  data  from  110  large  Swiss 
municipalities and found that fiscal burden illusion is highly correlated with the type of democratic 
decision-making process adopted.  They note that it is the latter rather than the individual decision 
which determine the final fiscal  outco~e and the presence of tax burden illusion.  They also find 
some evidence of simultaneous presence of illusion on both the revenue and the expenditure side of 
fiscal actions.  Little analysis has been devoted to the existence of  expenditure benefit illusion. -20-
to  zero  (the  null  hypothesis)  is  tested  on the  basis  of the  F  and  of the  likelihood  ratio 
statistics. 
The results of  these tests are presented in Table 6.  In seven of the thirteen Member States 
(Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France, Portugal, Austria,  and Finland),  the hypothesis that the 
fiscal position is a predictor of  current government expenditure cannot be rejected at the 99% 
level of significance.  In the case of Italy the hypothesis finds  support at the 95% level of 
significance.  In the remaining cases, there is no causality from the fiscal position to the level 
of  current government spending. 
These results provide considerable support to the postulated hypothesis,  and some tentative 
explanations consistent with the findings can be suggested for several Member States. .  In the 
case  of Belgium it is  possible  that the  results  reflect  the  failure  to resolve  constitutional 
difficulties  which have  given rise to the unprecedented  level  of indebtedness;  government 
spending  through  deficit  finance  may  have  been  resorted  to alleviate  actual  and  potential 
regional  frictions.  Furthermore,  as  de  Haan  et.  al.  (1992)  have  noted,  the  consultative 
management of  the social security system is responsible for the rise in Belgium's public debt; 
it cannot be  excluded that such an  arrangement is  conducive to increasing the size  of the 
public sector.  The data also show that fiscal imbalances Granger-cause government spending 
in the case of  France too.  A distinctive characteristics of  French fiscal policy, especially in the 
1980s,  has  been its redistributive character which could  explain this finding;  redistribution 
policies have been pursued by virtually all the European countries in the post-War period31 . 
The interpretation of the finding that fiscal imbalances contribute to government spending in 
the cases of  Spain and Portugal is less transparent.  In terms of  the Rogers and Rogers (1995) 
political competition prediction,  Spain and  Portugal,  over half of the years included in the 
sample when political parties were banned, could not be considered as meeting this condition. 
31  See Le Casheux (1994) for a review of the French experience.  Meltzer and Richard (1981,  1983) 
have  shown  that the  demand  for  income/wealth  redistribution  policies  is  an  important  factor 
explaining the size of government.  This demand, in the manner of Alexis de Toqueville's original 
conception of the American democracy, is a positive function of income inequality;  the latter is, in 
turn, a stylized fact of economic growth where incomes of skilled workers rise faster than incomes of 
unskilled individuals,  giving rise to votes  favouring  income  redistribution.  Such policies  would 
affect not only the current but also future generations of taxpayers, thus, contributing to government 
deficits and to the growth of  public debt.  Usher (1977) has also shown that support for redistributive 
public expenditure can arise from a median-voter model, while Boadway and Marchand (1995) show 
that  public  expenditure  policies  can  be  justified  on  redistributive  grounds.  One  measure  of 
redistribution policies  is  the  share  of the budget allocated  to  and the  steady  increase  in social 
transfers which has taken place over the past thirty or so years;  Todd (1983) has documented this 
development for the pre-1986 enlargement of the Community.  In general,  redistributive policies 
have been a dominant feature of  European macroeconomics over much of  the period since the 1960s, 
and it is possible that in several of the cases reported presently, where government deficits Granger-
cause government expenditure, this is reflected in the data correlations.  Todd (1983)  finds  some 
suggestive evidence for this hypothesis on an earlier set of Community data.  While not directly 
tested in this paper, should this hypothesis find independent support in other work, it would suggest 
that the resolution of fiscal  imbalances  in the  Community and the reduction of the  size  of the 
government will require more than a  simple expenditure and revenue adjustment, but,  instead,  a 
more fundamental, political, decision. -21-
However, with the restitution of  democracy, political competition has become intense and this 
would support the notion that public sector imbalances are a cause of the rise in the size of 
the government32.  Political competition is also a dominant feature of budgetary outcomes in 
the case of Italy33  where the Rogers and  Rogers prediction is  also  borne out by  the data. 
Italy's  regional redistribution policies  have undoubtedly had  an important impact  on fiscal 
performance. 
The  support  of the  hypothesis  in  Finland's  and  Austria's  cases  may  also  reflect  voters' 
perceptions about the costs of  government expenditure but, more generally, about the role of 
the government in society.  Both these nations, but also  Germany where the hypothesis also 
finds  support, have had political arrangements characterized by consensus building in public 
policy  during  the period  covered by  the  sample;  these arrangements may  have  supported 
growth in  public  expenditure  and  they may  also  have  obscured  the  implications  of fiscal 
imbalances. 
The data reject Granger-causality from fiscal  imbalances to government expenditure in the 
cases of Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland,  the Netherlands,  and  the UK.  At least in the case of 
Greece, one would have expected that the hypothesis of  fiscal illusion and of  resorting to debt 
finance to resolve distributional problems would find support.  Also, Denmark's redistributive 
policies, it could be argued, would lend support to causality between fiscal  imbalances and 
government spending.  It is possible, however, that the reforms of  the Danish public finances 
which were implemented in the 1980s are actually obscuring the relationship between fiscal 
deficits and government spending. 
It should be stressed that the results presented in Table 6 are only suggestive.  They do not 
directly  test  the  Buchanan-Wagner,  or  the  Rogers  and  Rogers  political  competition, 
hypothesis but they are only consistent with its basic premise.  A more precise and rigorous 
test, together with evidence from political arrangements and institutions, would be necessary 
in order to provide a proper empirical  evaluation of the hypothesis,  and  to determine  the 
factors  which  have  played  a  role  in  the  increase  of the  size  of the  government  in  the 
Community since the early 1960s34. 
32 
33 
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Gonzalez  Paramo  et.  al.  (1994)  and  Nogueira  Leite  (1994)  give  an overview  of the  political 
environment in Spain and Portugal, respectively, within which fiscal policy choices have been made 
during the period since the restitution of democracy. 
See European Economy (1993) for a discussion of  fiscal performance in Italy. 
Roubini  and Sachs  (1989a,  1989b)  and the papers in the Lybeck  and Henrekson  (1988)  volume 
provide tests ofvarious hypotheses on the determinants of fiscal performance.  Niskanen (1978) also 
provides a test on US data, even though his evidence is not definitive.  The hypothesis rests crucially 
on the empirical evidence that the perceived tax-price elasticity of public services is negative.  The 
US data for the period 1947-76 suggest that this elasticity is -0.6;  the short-run income elasticity of 
demand for federal  services is 1.1  and the long-run elasticity is 0.35.  These results  suggest that 
federal deficits have raised real federal spending.  In absolute terms, however, this effect is not very 
large.  Niskanen notes that the mean value of the federal deficit as percent of federal spending over 
the period 1947-76 was 4.4%;  therefore, the deficit raised federal spending by about 2.7o/o  during 
this period relative to the level  where  a balanced budget had been maintained.  To  place these 
estimates in perspective, the federal deficit in the 197 5 recession represented around 20% of federal 
spending when the level of  federal spending was about 13.2% higher than the balanced budget level. -22-
VIII.  Concluding Remarks 
Fiscal  data from  the thirteen Community Member  States under review provide  substantial 
support,  on the basis of a bivariate vector autoregressive model,  to the notion that there is 
interdependence  in  budgetary  decisions  which  have  implications  for  fiscal  performance. 
Among  these  Member  States,  only  in  the  case  of the  UK  the  data  suggest  that  the 
expenditure, revenue, and fiscal balance time series are independent.  The data show that, in a 
sample of  thirteen Member States, in more than half causality is uni-directional.  In this group 
of countries,  the  evidence  suggests  that  in  two  cases,  those  of Denmark  and  of the 
Netherlands,  causality  is  running  from  general  government  expenditure  to  revenues.  In 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Austria and Finland, on the other hand, causality is found to run from 
revenues to government expenditure. 
An implication of these results, which are specific to the bivariate model used,  is that fiscal 
adjustment in the first group will require control of  government spending, holding the revenue 
side of  the budget constant.  The results also indicate that expenditure shocks, starting from a 
given fiscal position, will ultimately lead to a deterioration in the fiscal balance in the case of 
the Netherlands since the long-run expenditure multiplier is  less than unity;  in the case of 
Denmark, on the other hand, such expenditure shocks would raise revenues by an equivalent 
amount leaving the deficit unchanged. 
The feasibility of fiscal adjustment in the second group (Belgium, Ireland, Italy,  Austria and 
Finland), where revenues are found to Granger-cause public spending, may be more in doubt. 
An increase  in  taxation,  according  to  the  results,  will  ultimately  lead  to  an  increase  in 
spending.  In addition, the long-run revenue multiplier in virtually all countries in this group 
is unity, lending support to the notion that fiscal adjustment through revenue increases alone 
may have little effect on fiscal performance. 
Bi-directional causality characterizes the fiscal  data of Germany,  Greece,  Spain,  France and 
Portugal.  The evidence on bi-directional causality raises many questions about the feasibility 
of fiscal adjustment based on policies affecting the revenue and the expenditure side of the 
budget independently of each other.  If the structure determining the prediction of revenues 
and  of expenditure  remains  unchanged,  the  results  suggest  that  expenditure  cuts  will 
ultimately lead to revenue reductions;  similarly, revenue increases will correspondingly lead 
to expenditure increases.  In the case of Spain, the revenue multiplier is twice as large as the 
expenditure multiplier,  implying that a combination of revenue and  expenditure shocks will 
lead  to a worsening of the fiscal  balance.  In the remaining  cases  among those where bi-
directional  causality  is  found,  and  with  the  exception  of Greece,  will  a  balance  budget 
property be preserved in the event of  expenditure or revenue shocks. 
The evidence is to a limited degree consistent with the structural/institutional view of fiscal 
performance.  The history of the fiscal  process in five  Member  States  (Denmark,  Ireland, 
Italy,  the Netherlands,  and  the UK) is  a better predictor of the current fiscal  position than 
when  either  the  expenditure  or the  revenue  time  series  are  used  as  predictors.  In  the 
remaining  eight  Member  States,  however,  the  history  of government  expenditure  and 
revenues is a better predictor of  the fiscal position than the fiscal position itself -23-
Finally,  the  data  provide  evidence  that  fiscal  imbalances  Granger-cause  government 
expenditure  and  contribute  to  the  size  of the  government,  measured  by  government 
expenditure,  in eight Member States (Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Portugal,  Austria, 
Finland,  and  Italy).  There  are  three  principal  hypotheses  which  are  consistent  with  this 
finding.  First,  there  is  the  Buchanan-Wagner  argument  that  the  current  generation  of 
taxpayers  underestimates  the  cost  of public  spending  associated  with  deficit  -financed 
policies;  governments  are  cognisant  of this  illusion  and  exploit  the  negative  tax-price 
elasticity  of  demand  for  public  spending  by  expanding  deficit-financed  expenditure. 
Secondly,  Rogers  and  Rogers  (1995)  have  pointed  out the fiscal  implications  of political 
competition and its contribution to the growth of  the size of  the government in decentralized 
democracies.  And,  third,  the  rise  in  mean  incomes  relative  to the  median  income  in  all 
Community  countries  since  the  early  1960s,  and  the  consequent  demand  for  income 
redistribution,  may  have,  as  suggested  by  Meltzer  and  Richard's  ( 1981)  amendment  of 
Wagner's law,  contributed decisively to the increase in the size of the government.  Without 
directly testing these hypotheses,  it is possible that the causality evidence is  hinting that the 
nature of  political discourse is responsible for the increase in the size of  the public sector over 
the past thirty four years in these Member States. 
In recent years, fiscal consolidation appears to have become particularly difficult at the same 
time as the urgency to accomplish it has also  become more pronounced35.  Virtually all the 
Member States have now submitted convergence programs, and they are expected to follow 
these commitments in  the advance to stage III of EMU.  These  programs clearly  signal  a 
break from  the  history of the  determination  of fiscal  variables  characterizing  the  Member 
States over the past thirty or so years.  The causality evidence discussed here suggests that 
such a break will be an essential ingredient for the achievement of durable fiscal rectitude in 
the Community. 
35  See  the  country  reviews  prepared  for  the  European  Economy  (1994)  for  a  discussion  of these 
difficulties and the prospects for fiscal adjustment in the Member States. -24-
ANNEX I 
The Time Series Properties of the Expenditure and Revenue Data 
Granger causality tests require that the time  series in question are  stationary.  Since most 
macroeconomic time series are not stationary, it is essential to examine the properties of  the 
revenue and  expenditure series under investigation.  Stationarity tests are reported in the 
Table  A 1 for  the individual  nominal  general  government  revenues  and  expenditure  time 
series in thirteen Community Member States36, based on the following equation: 
(A. I) 
where X is the variable in question, Time is a time trend,  !!:,.  is a first-difference operator and 
w is an error term.  Equation (A. I), which is an augmented Dickey-Fuller equation, allows 
for the possibility that the series have a time trend, as visual inspection suggests, while the 
lagged first-difference terms allow for autocorrelation correction.  Stationarity requires that 
the roots of  the residuals lie within the unit circle. 
Table A. I presents the unit root tests undertaken to determine the time series properties of 
the government revenue and expenditure data.  Stationarity of  the data used in the Granger-
causality  regressions  is  a  necessary  condition  to  determine  the  historical  correlations 
characterizing the data.  The fiscal balance variable obeys the same time series properties as 
its constituent parts. 
The results are based on estimating equation (A. I) and  on assessing the stationarity of the 
residuals.  The test statistic used for testing stationarity is the MacKinnon surface response 
statistic37.  Unlike  the  Dickey-Fuller  and  other test  statistics,  the  MacKinnon  statistic  is 
conditional upon the number of observations and the presence or absence of  a time trend as 
well as the number of variables used in the regression.  The null hypothesis is that the time 
series is non-stationary;  rejection of  the null requires that the regression estimate of  the test 
statistic is greater in absolute value than the critical value of  the MacKinnon statistic. 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  results  presented  in  Table  AI,  in  virtually  all  cases  the  level 
specification of the variables  does not reject non-stationary.  The exceptions are Belgium 
36 
37 
Luxembourg and Sweden are excluded since the time series were either incomplete (in the case of 
Luxembourg observations for  the years  1988-90 are missing)  or particularly short for  empirical 
analysis (in the case of Sweden the data starts in 1980).  The source of  the data is the Mvffi.CO data 
bank. 
See MacKinnon (1991).  The critical values are calculated as  (~ + yff + ()ff2), where  ~ is the 
estimate of  the asymptotic critical value for a test of size p, and y and () are estimates of  the slope of 
the response function conditional upon the sample size T.  MacKinnon provides estimates of the 
critical values for different significance levels and for various variable combinations, as well as for 
the case where a constant and a time trend are included in the estimating equation. (revenues),  Germany  (expenditure 
and  revenues),  Greece 
(expenditure), Portugal (revenues), 
UK  (revenues)  and  Austria 
(revenues).  However,  all  the 
results  provide  statistically 
significant  estimates  for  the 
coefficient  of the  time  trend  and, 
as  a  result,  the  time  senes  of 
revenues  and  expenditure  are 
characterized  either  as  non-
stationary  or  as  trend-stationary. 
In either case, spurious regressions 
are  at issue  and  to  remove  these 
problems, the series has been first-
differenced.  As  can  also  be  seen 
from the two last columns of  Table 
Al, the  hypothesis  that the  series 
is  stationary cannot be  rejected in 
all  but  three  cases:  in  Portugal 
(expenditure)  and  In  the  UK 
(expenditure).  Second-
differencing  these  senes,  on  the 
other  hand,  yields  stationarity,  as 
shown  by  the  additional  statistics 
reported  under  the  relevant 
headings.  The  time  senes 
properties  of  the  fiscal  balance 
data (the results for which are not 
reported  here  for  reasons  of 
economy),  which  IS  a  linear 
combination of,  and  is  defined  as 
the  difference  between, 
government  revenues  and  total 
expenditure, are also characterized 
as  non-stationary  In  level  form; 
these  senes  are  integrated  I( 1  ), 
however.  The  fiscal  balance  data 
were  used  In  the  estimates 
presented  In  section  VII  of the 
text. 
Table  A2  presents  the 
cointegration  properties  of  the 
data.  The cointegration estimation 
was  based  on  the  Johansen 
maxtmum  likelihood  estimation 
procedure.  The Johansen method 
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TableA1 
Stationarity Tests for General Government 
Expenditure (EXP) and Revenues (REV) in 13 
Community Member States, 1960-1994 
Level  First  difference 
Variable  DF  ADF(l)  DF  ADF(l) 
B  EXP  -2.66  -3.49  -4.43  -4.73 
REV  -4.97  -3.18  -7.60  -4.06 
DK  EXP  -3.32  -3.53  -4.99  -4.24 
REV  -2.73  -2.31  -5.81  -3.36 
D  EXP  -3.39  -4.16  -4.64  -4.91 
REV  -4.74  -3.63  -6.24  -4.08 
GR1  EXP  -4.39  -4.30  -5.47  -5.34 
REV 
E2  EXP 
REV 
F  EXP 
REV 
1RL  EXP 
REV 
I  EXP 
REV 
NL  EXP 
REV 
p  EXP 
EXP3 
REV 
UK  EXP 
EXP3 
REV 
REV3 
A  EXP 
REV 
SF  EXP 
REV 
-3.09 
-2.53 
-3.55 
-1.92 
-2.09 
-2.76 
-3.30 
-3.06 
-3.24 
-2.46 
-3.74 
-2.20 
-6.17 
-3.77 
-3.17 
-3.17 
-3.61 
-2.62 
-3.59 
-3.69  -4.31  -3.29 
-2.50  -4.64  -3.31 
-2.26  -8.74  -5.87 
-2.75  -3.82  -3.31 
-2.02  -5.44  -3.55 
-2.38  -5.63  -3.29 
-2.43  -7.17  -3.53 
-2.13  -5.09  -2.94 
-1.66  -7.15  -2.52 
-2.86  -4.84  -4.41 
-2.84  -6.03  -3.96 
-3.88  -4.01  -3.17 
-5.37  -2.99 
-4.10  -6.83  -3.13 
-3.41  -4.02  -3.72 
-5.33  -4.55 
-4.65  -3.66  -4.05 
-4.40  -4.07 
-3.74  -4.08  -3.71 
-4.68  -5.15  -4.23 
-3.89  -4.24  -4.08 
-3.99  -4.93  -3.61 
DF  and ADF  are the Dickey-Fuller and the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  statistics,  respectively~  ADF(l)  is  the 
ADF  statistic of order 1  ~  the critical values of the DF 
and  ADF(l)  statistics,  calculated  by  the  MacKinnon 
method, at the 95% level of significance are -4.08 and-
4.09, respectively. 
1 Sample  1975-1994~  for  the  level  specification  the 
critical values of the DF and ADF statistics, at the 95% 
level of significance, are -4.22  and -4.24,  respectively~ 
for  the  first-difference  specification the  corresponding 
critical values are -3.70 and  -3.72. 
2  Sample  1971-1994~ for  the  level  specification  the 
critical values of the DF and ADF statistics, at the 95% 
level of significance, are -4.22  and -4.26,  respectively~ 
for  the  frrst-difference  specification the  corresponding 
critical values are -3.65 and -3.68. 
3  First  difference  of  the  frrst  difference  (second 
difference)  specification~  critical values of the DF  and 
the ADF statistics, at the 95% level of  significance, are -
4.10 and -4.11, respectively. TableA2 
Cointegration Between General Government 
Revenues and Total Expenditure: Johansen 
Methodology 
(1960-94;  trended case;  no trend in data 
generating process) 
Maximal 
eigenvalue  Trace 
criterion  criterion 
Test  Test 
VAR  statistic  statistic 
B  1  26.38  28.08 
DK  1  38.59  42.03 
D  2  21.14  26.29 
E  1  40.30  42.83 
F  1  31.83  31.86 
IRL  1  47.29  47.29 
I  1  60.92  60.94 
NL  1  23.22  24.84 
p  4  65.25  65.27 
UK  1  35.22  35.76 
A  1  70.65  74.98 
SF  1  79.42  79.52 
V  AR  indicates  the  lag  order  used  in  the 
cointegrating regression;  the critical value of the 
test  statistic at the  95%  level  of significance  is 
14.90  under  the  maximal  eigenvalue  criterion, 
and 17.95 under the trace criterion. 
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TableAJ 
Long-Run Expenditure and 
Revenue Multipliers Implied by 
the Cointegration Vectors 
m(X)  m(R) 
B  - 0.77 
DK  0.90  -
D  0.93  1.07 
E  - 0.80 
F  0.78  0.79 
I  - 1.15 
NL  0.90  -
p  0.87  1.14 
A  - 1.13 
SF  - 1.20 
m (X) = expenditure multiplier 
m (R) =revenue multiplier 
utilizes  two  criteria  for  establishing 
the  presence  of cointegration:  the 
maximal  eigenvalues  and  the trace of 
the  stochastic  matrix.  The  null 
hypothesis in the first case is that there 
are  at  most  r  cointegrating  vectors 
against  the  alternative  that  there  are 
r+ 1  cointegrating  vectors;  in  the 
second case, the null hypothesis is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the 
alternative that there are at least r or more cointegrating vectors.  Since the first test posits 
the alternative hypothesis as an equality it is considered to be more powerful than the second 
test38. 
Table A2 presents the test results for the existence of cointegration among the revenue and 
expenditure variables, under the hypothesis that there is a time trend in the series but there is 
no trend in the data generating process.  The results establish that there is a unique vector in 
each case examined (there are insufficient data in the case of Greece and,  consequently, no 
results  are  reported).  The  null  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected  both  on the  basis  of the 
maximal eigenvalue criterion and on the basis of  the trace of the stochastic matrix criterion. 
As can be seen from Table A2,  the calculated statistic is larger than the critical value at the 
95% level of significance in  all  case examined.  The results also  show that the hypothesis 
that  there  are  more  than  one  cointegrating  vectors  is  not  supported  by  the  data  (the 
38  See  S.  Johansen  and  K.  Juselius  (1990).  The  results  presented  here  were  obtained  with  the 
MICROFIT 3.0 program. -27-
calculated  statistics  in  these  cases,  not  shown 
presently,  are  consistently  lower  than  the  critical 
values). 
Note also  that the cointegration vectors allow  the 
direct  measurement  of the  expenditure  and  of the 
revenue multipliers.  These are the long-run part of 
the  cointegrating  relationship  and,  as  noted  in 
footnote  14,  the vectors yield  estimates which  are 
comparable in magnitude to those reported in Table 
4 of the text.  If the respective multipliers have  a 
value  of one,  a  balanced  budget  property  would 
characterize the  fiscal  policy  and  the  cointegrating 
vector should be  [  -1,  1] .  In this  case,  the  deficit 
(the  difference  between expenditure  and  revenues) 
would  be  a stationary variable  and  that  shocks  to 
revenues or expenditure would be transitory in their 
effect  on  the  fiscal  deficit;  in  other  words,  the 
deficit process would be mean reverting.  (It is also 
clear  that  in  a  three-dimensional  autoregressive 
system the necessary condition for the cointegration 
of  government expenditure, revenues, and the deficit 
series  which  is  consistent  with  a  balanced  budget 
property  is  [  -1,  1,  1]).  Table  A3  presents  the 
estimated  expenditure  and  revenue  multipliers 
implicit  in  the  cointegration  vectors.  The  results 
suggest that, in general, the [  -1,  1]  restriction on the 
cointegration  vector  is  not  satisfied  and, 
consequently,  the  data  suggest  that  in  the  sample  under 
leading to budget imbalances. 
IableA~ 
Long-Run Expenditure and 
Revenue Multipliers Implied by 
the Cointegratton Vectors 
m(R)  m(X) 
B  ·1  1.30 
DK  ·1  1.13 
D  ·1  0.93 
E  ·1  0.80 
F  ·1  0.79 
I  ·1  0.87 
IRL  ·1  1.21 
NL  ·1  0.90 
p  ·1  1.17 
UK  ·1  0.69 
A  ·1  0.89 
SF  ·1  0.83 
m (X) = expenditure multiplier 
m (R) = revenue multiplier 
LR 
X
2(1) 
1.~3* 
16.98 
13.12 
27.93 
19.23 
10.41 
16.0~ 
21.61 
17.~4 
27.89 
~~.2~ 
69.47 
*  m(R) =  m(X) cannot be rejected 
LR  X
2
( 1)  = likelihood  ratio;  critical 
value  at  the  95%  level  of 
significance is 3.84. 
consideration  there  are  forces 
To test more formally the restriction that the cointegration vector is [-1,  1], Table A4 shows 
the  estimated  unrestricted  cointegrating  vectors  for  general  government  revenues  and 
expenditure  for  twelve  Member  States  (Greece  is  not  included  due  to  lack  of adequate 
observations) irrespective of whether the causality order indicates that both multipliers are 
pertinent,  together  with  the  test  (likelihood  ratio)  statistic  for  the  restriction  that  the 
multipliers are equal to unity (the V  AR order is the same as that shown in Table A2).  This 
restriction is rejected in eleven of  the twelve cases;  the exceptions is Belgium.  On the basis 
of  these results, it is clear that a balanced budget property would be preserved in Belgium, 
whereas, judging from  the relative  size  of the multipliers,  there appears to  be  a tendency 
towards deficits in the remaining cases except in Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal where the 
expenditure multiplier is considerably higher than the revenue multiplier.  In the latter cases, 
an  expenditure shock would raise revenues by  approximately  15  to 20  percent above  the 
expenditure change. 
Table A5  presents the estimated weights by  which disequilibrium in the revenue  equation 
induces  adjustments  in  revenues  and  expenditure  towards  the  estimated  cointegration 
relationship.  These  weights  enter the  revenue  and  expenditure  equations  in  the  error--28-
correction model implicit in the Johansen maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure.  The interpretation 
of  the weights is as follows:  in the case of  Belgium, 
for  example,  the  first  weight  under  the  heading 
"Revenue equation",  gives the speed  of adjustment 
by  which  a  1 percent  deviation  from  the  long-run 
relationship  induces  a  0. 08  percent  adjustment 
towards  the  long-run  relationship  each  year. 
Similarly,  the  same  deviation  also  induces  a  0.08 
percent adjustment in expenditure towards the long-
run  relationship,  as  can  be  seen  under  the 
"Expenditure equation" column. 
In general, the estimates suggest that disequilibrium 
in  the  revenue  side  of  the  budget  induces 
adjustments not only in the revenue but also  in the 
expenditure  side.  The  sign  of  the  adjustment 
weights in the identified cointegration vector should 
be negative to  ensure  stability.  Thus,  if estimated 
revenues  are  above  their  equilibrium  value,  then 
actual  revenues  would  tend  to  decrease  towards 
Table AS 
Short-Run Adjustment Weights in 
the Revenue and Expenditure 
Equations 
Revenue  Expenditure 
equation  equation 
B  0.08  0.08 
DK  0.29  0.29 
D  -0.34  -1.18 
E  -0.58  -0.89 
F  -0.26  -0.34 
I  1.00  1.13 
IRL  0.19  0.15 
NL  -0.41  -0.86 
p  1.77  0.98 
UK  -012  -0.19 
A  -0.78  -1.11 
SF  -0.25  -0.42 
equilibrium if  the adjustment coefficient is negative;  on the other hand, if  estimated revenues 
are above the equilibrium value, then expenditure would tend to increase if the adjustment 
weight in the expenditure equation is positive.  The adjustment weights in the revenue and 
expenditure equations are  positive in  the  cases  of Belgium,  Denmark,  Italy,  Ireland,  and 
Portugal (with the exception of Italy and Portugal, the other coefficients are rather small in 
size).  These suggest that disequilibrium in the revenue equation does not lead to equilibrium 
adjustments  in  revenues  but  rather  in  expenditure.  Thus,  if revenues  are  above  the 
equilibrium  relationship,  actual  revenues  would  tend  to  increase  and  correspondingly, 
expenditure would tend to increase too.  The  estimated  adjustment weights  suggest that 
there is evidence of  instability in the budgetary process of  these Member States. 
The data suggest the opposite for  the remaining  Member  States.  Here,  the revenue  and 
expenditure adjustment weights are negative.  These signs indicate that when revenues are 
above  the  equilibrium value,  actual  revenues would tend to  decline  towards  equilibrium; 
furthermore, when revenues are above equilibrium,  expenditure would tend to decline too, 
thus supporting budgetary adjustment.  It would appear that the budgetary process in these 
Member States is more stable than that suggested for the previous group. 
A comparison of the adjustment weights categorizes the Member States as follows:  first, 
there is the group of  countries where the adjustment weights are virtually identical (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, and the UK);  secondly, there is a group of  countries where 
the expenditure adjustment dominates quantitatively the revenue adjustment in response to a 
disequilibrium  in  the  revenue  equation  (Germany,  Spain,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  and 
Finland;  and,  in the case of Portugal the revenue weights is  substantially larger than the 
expenditure weight, implying that deviations from equilibrium in the revenue function give 
rise to substantially greater adjustment on the revenue, rather than the expenditure, side of -29-
the budget.  Note also the virtual lack of  adjustment to equilibrium implied by the weights in 
the case ofBelgium. 
In most cases the adjustment to deviations from the cointegrating relationship appear to be 
slow.  With the exception of Germany,  Italy,  Portugal,  and  Austria,  where the respective 
weights  imply  a  virtual  one-to-one  relationship  between  deviations  from  the  long-run 
relationship  and  subsequent  revenue  and/or  expenditure  adjustment,  in  the  rest  of the 
Member States such deviations are incompletely offset within a year. 
Finally,  the fact that the estimated weights which enter the expenditure equation are non-
negligible in size suggests that government expenditure cannot be treated as exogenous to 
the  parameters  of the  conditional  revenue  model.  The  non-exogeneity  of government 
expenditure is,  not surprisingly,  consistent with the notion that fiscal  policy decisions  are 
made in such a manner that both the revenue and  the expenditure side of the budget are 
affected. -30-
ANNEX II 
Some Diagnostics of the Granger-Causality Estimates 
This Annex reports some additional diagnostic results for the Granger  -causality equations 
used in the discussion of  section VII of  the main text.  First, it is necessary that the equations 
have adequate explanatory power in determining the variance of  the dependent variable;  this 
is  especially  so  since  the 
expenditure-to-revenue  causality 
estimates are used to determine the 
value  of the  long-run  expenditure 
multipliers.  And,  secondly,  an 
important  condition  for  the 
reliability  of the  Granger  -causality 
tests,  based  on  testing  the  null 
hypothesis  that  the  vector  of 
coefficients  of  the  variable  is 
question  is  jointly  not  different 
from zero, is that residuals are not 
autocorrelated.  Serial  correlation 
would  invalidate  the  test  results 
based on the measured F statistics 
since  the  latter  would  not  be 
distributed  according  to  the  F 
distribution. 
Table  A6  reports  the  adjusted  R2 
and  the  F  ratio  for  the  Granger-
causality equations presented in the 
text.  The adjusted R2 suggests that 
the  independent  variables  in  the 
equations  explain  a  large  part  of 
the  variance  of  the  dependent 
variable.  Note that the  equations 
were  estimated  in  first-difference 
form  as  well.  In the Revenue-to-
Expenditure  causality  the  highest 
R.2 is found in the cases of Greece, 
Spain,  France,  and  Finland;  the 
TableA6 
Statistical Characteristics of the Granger-Causality 
Equations 
From Revenue  From Expenditure 
toE~diture  to Revenue 
Adjusted  Adjusted 
R2  F ratio  R2  F ratio 
B  0.76  1.49  0.54  0.04 
DK  0.63  0.11  0.86  6.53 
D  0.66  0.38  0.56  0.01 
GR  0.95  0.99  0.97  0.05 
E  0.94  1.21  0.60  0.37 
F  0.86  0.07  0.90  0.29 
IRL  0.65  0.50  0.72  0.53 
I  0.81  0.55  0.82  0.11 
NL  0.57  0.51  0.56  0.71 
p  0.57  11.70  0.78  0.01 
UK  0.02  0.96  0.41  1.32 
A  0.90  0.42  0.59  0.09 
SF  0.88  0.19  0.62  5.03 
The F ratio tests the null hypothesis that the residuals from 
the causality regressions  are  an autoregressive  process  of 
order 1 against the alternative that they are not;  rejection of 
the  null  requires  F  values  significantly  larger  than  the 
critical values. 
lowest R2  is  found  in  the  case  of the  UK,  and  in  the  cases  of the Netherlands  and  of 
Portugal.  In the Expenditure-to-Revenue causality the fit of each equation is equally good, 
with as much as 97% of  the variation in the dependent variable (Greece), and a minimum of 
41% (UK), explained by the independent variables. 
The F ratio is used to test the hypothesis that the residuals are serially correlated of order 
one  against  the  alternative  that they  are  not  serially  correlated.  Tests  for  higher  order -31-
autocorrelation were also  performed but the Langrange multiplier (LM) statistics did  not 
indicate that autocorrelation was a problem.  Serial correlation appears to be somewhat of  a 
concern in the cases of Portugal,  especially in the Revenue-to-Expenditure causality tests, 
and in Denmark, in the Expenditure-to-Revenue causality regressions.  However, additional 
tests for higher order serial correlation did not contribute to improving the results. -32-
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